reasoning modularly, and properties expressing equality and equivalence that can be used by Nuprl's rewriting machinery such as those mentioned in Sect. 3.2. Both the decomposition properties and rewrite theorems include general theorems and theorems speci c to SCI. The rewrites for message bu ers discussed in Sect. 3.2, for example, are not speci c to SCI, while the notion of rank is. The decomposition tactics rely on lemmas that we have proven, such as one stating that to show that inv(prg;s.I s]) holds, it su ces to consider one case for each action of the program and to show that the initial condition holds in the initial state. From this general lemma, we proved decomposition lemmas for SCI which decompose reasoning into 21 cases, one for each memory action and one for each processor action for some arbitrary processor p. We chose to further decompose conditional statements into cases so that each case contains only send, receive, and assignment statements. Rewriting operates on these simpli ed cases. Although these decomposition properties are speci c to SCI, we automated the generation of their statements | as well as a variety of other properties speci c to SCI | from the de nitions of the actions. Their proofs were often largely automatic also. We also automated the application of many of these lemmas by writing tactics which apply them and solve various subgoals automatically.
Of the 14 lemmas expressing invariants, the rst 8 (roughly 2.5 pages in 3]) are fairly simple and express properties about the values that various variables can take on during execution. For example, we prove:
read cache freshR(p; r; cv; arg) 2 buf p] ) p = m^q 2 P(n)^(r = nil _ r 2 P(n))^(arg = ok _ arg = gone)]:
Here P(n) denotes the set of processors involved in the protocol, with process identi ers 1; : : :; n. The 9 th lemma contains ve statements which together express the property of outstanding messages described in Sect. 3.2 as well as eight statements expressing which kind of outstanding message a processor p has depending on the value of status p . Lemmas 10 and 11 express a variety of properties of the form 2(P W Q) (where W is the weak until operator). We proved a general decomposition theorem for formulas of this form which makes the structure of these proofs similar to those for the other invariants. Lemma 12 expresses some basic properties about rank including two which follow directly from the de nition (which is slightly di erent but equivalent to the one given in 3]) and two which must be proven as invariants. While the invariants up to this point are large and detailed, they are fairly straightforward to prove. The main di culty in the proof is found in the 13 th and 14 th lemmas. Lemma 13 has 17 clauses and one assumption which later gets discharged and Lemma 14 has 7 clauses. They state the complex invariants about rank that are required to prove correctness of the protocol.
The proofs up through and including Lemma 11 are completed, as well as the two properties of Lemma 12 that follow from the de nition of rank. We have also proven 5 One of the key points is how the annotation type of a term relates to its subannotations and to the subannotations of an immediately surrounding term. We chose the minimal requirement that supports rewriting as described above, and so we require only respect for equality. As with ordinary typing in Nuprl, the validity of an annotation of a term is undecidable, and must be proven. One possibility would be to generate \type checking conditions" as PVS does, which are side conditions generated whenever a new term is introduced. This is not workable for Nuprl because tactics work by putting together appropriate primitive inference rules, and need an opportunity to assemble proofs of annotation validity at the same time as the proofs justifying the main inference. Rewriting works, for example, by taking a term and producing a rewritten term along with a proof of equality. For annotated terms, it is natural to modify rewriting to take an annotated term, and produce a new term, an equality proof, and also a proof that the new term's annotations are correct. We therefore have two kinds of annotations: one kind we can assume are valid during the course of a proof, and the other must be proved to be valid.
The annotation scheme is justi ed semantically,and requires a re-interpretation of the semantics of sequents. A full report is in preparation. In a proof of this magnitude, it was essential to provide a high degree of automation. Our automation falls roughly into two categories: tactics that decompose it becomes 0 at which point it is allowed to write if it has requested to do so. Rank is de ned by ltering from the history all read and write requests that memory has received, projecting out the sender, and keeping only the rst occurrence of each active processor in the resulting list. The rst occurrence corresponds to a processor's most recent request. We prove a variety of lemmas describing how a processor's rank changes with changes in the state. These lemmas are also used as rewrite rules in proving invariants.
A Type Annotation Scheme for Nuprl
Our type annotation scheme is a way of attaching type expressions, which we call annotations, to all (or only some) of the subterms of a term. Our scheme meets the following goals.
1. Annotations are optional. Terms that do not have annotations attached to them are treated as before by Nuprl's tactics. 2. If a term t is introduced into a proof as a member of a type T, and t occurs somewhere in the current goal with a compatible annotation, then the requirement to prove t 2 T is eliminated.
3. Annotations justify rewriting, so that a subterm with an annotation A can be replaced by an equal term (qua member of A) without further justi cation. 4. There are no heuristics in the scheme per se. Although type inference and checking are highly heuristic in Nuprl, this is independent of the annotation scheme. Annotations for terms are generated by examining the results of applying Nuprl's existing machinery. 5. Annotations can be e ectively maintained. In principal, it is possible for annotations to be lost during inference. For example, the generalized term in the induction rule needs to reannotated (or left without annotations). However, such inference steps form a tiny fraction in practice. For example, annotations are almost never lost during equational rewriting. 6. There are no global tables. We retain the tree-structuring of proofs, with independence of proof branches, that allows us, among other things, to do dependency-directed backtracking, and selective replay of subproofs. 7. Soundness depends only on a xed set of primitive inference rules that all proofs must reduce to. 8. The scheme is almost entirely invisible to users.
The type theory of the PVS system 9] has some similarities to Nuprl, such as subtypes, (a limited form of) dependent types, and undecidable typechecking. PVS uses a typing discipline that achieves most of the goals above, but it would only be applicable to an insu ciently small subtheory of Nuprl. Some complicating aspects of Nuprl, which aren't present in PVS, are: universe polymorphism; type-indexed equality, so that two terms may both be in two types, but be equal in one type and not in the other; contravariant subtyping, where a function type is enlarged when its domain is shrunk; and general dependent types. In addition, the PVS scheme does not address 7 above.
The most interesting point in this translation is the function for head of a list. In HOL, this is a total function on lists. When we import it into Nuprl, we must prove that the interpretation returns a value on every list, empty or not. Since hhd is polymorphic, given an arbitrary type and the empty list as an argument, it must choose some arbitrary member of the type as output. Thus we must give hhd a noncomputable de nition in Nuprl. However, we can prove that this function is the same as Nuprl's hd when the list is non-empty. This gives us a conditional rewrite which goes through for this example theorem.
HOL Math Used in the SCI Veri cation
The main source of HOL theorems used in the SCI veri cation is a large body of theorems about lists. Lists are important in two central areas of the proof. First, the de nition and proof of properties about the contents of bu ers require sophisticated list manipulation since, as mentioned, they are computed from the history component of a state. For example, from the de nition of bu er, it fairly is straightforward to prove that when a message M is sent to process p in state s, its bu er becomes M::((buf p]) s) where :: is the cons operator. The proof that but_last_el((buf p]) s) is the contents of p's bu er after p receives a message is signi cantly more complex. The operator but_last_el is de ned in an HOL library in terms of the lastn operator (the operation which extracts the last n elements of a list) which is also de ned in HOL. The snoc operator, which is the opposite of cons (in particular, the property snoc(x;l) = l @ (x:: ]) holds, where @ is the append operator), is also de ned in HOL and is useful for reasoning about these operators. The existing HOL theorems about these and a variety of other operators were directly usable in this and other proofs.
The above two theorems are examples of lemmas used as rewrite rules. Nuprl provides powerful automation for the application of rewrite lemmas and good use of this machinery is essential for a large proof such as the SCI veri cation. We proved and make extensive use of numerous other rewrite lemmas involving histories and bu ers. A variety of other theorems about histories and bu ers have also been proved and used as support for other kinds of rewrite lemmas.
One invariant (part of Lemma 9 3]) states that any processor has at most one outstanding message. In particular, for any Q/R pair, there is at most one Q message for which a processor is waiting for the corresponding R message. This means that there is either 0 or 1 Q messages from a processor p in some q's bu er, or there is 0 or 1 R messages in p's bu er, but not both. Our rewrite lemmas along with various other list operators and properties from HOL play a central role in proving this fact.
The second area of the proof in which lists are important is in de ning the notion of rank. Rank roughly corresponds to the order in which processors have requested to read or write to the cache. It is only de ned for active processors, a property of processors that are on or \mostly on" the doubly linked list. An important property is the fact that for any processor, its rank does not increase. This property insures that the list does not contain circularities. As long as a process stays active (and a few other properties hold) its rank will decrease until mathematics related to software modeling and semantic connections to external tools. We have taken a rst step toward this kind of sharing by borrowing some of the mathematics we needed for our veri cation from HOL.
Importation of mathematics from HOL into Nuprl is done at the theory level. An HOL theory consists of some type and individual constants, some axioms (usually de nitional) constraining the constants, and a set of theorems following from the axioms (and the axioms of ancestor theories). To import a theory, one interprets the type constants with Nuprl types and the term constants with members of the appropriate types, and then proves the axioms. When this is done, the theorems can then all be accepted immediately as Nuprl theorems. Typechecking is undecidable in Nuprl, so the well-typedness of interpreting terms must be proven explicitly.
Theorems directly imported from HOL are usually of a form that makes them useless for direct application in Nuprl proofs. It turns out that massaging the theorems into the desired form is possible, and is largely automatable.
To illustrate what kind of transformations are needed on directly imported mathematics, consider an example from list theory. The following is a raw import of a HOL theorem stating that a non-empty list is a cons. Because Nuprl currently has a single at namespace, the names of all imported constants have an \h" prepended to avoid con icts with Nuprl objects. The outermost quantier quanti es over the type S of all (small) non-empty types (this quanti er is implicit in HOL).
8'a:S "(hall ( l:hlist('a).
himplies (hnot (hnull l)) (hequal (hcons (hhd l) (htl l)) l)))
Apart from the outermost quanti er, the logical connectives themselves are imported constants. The transformed, \Nuprl-friendly" theorem generated from the above is 8'a:S. 8l:'a List. :mt(l) ) hd(l)::tl(l) = l.
The logical connectives in HOL are all boolean-valued functions, possibly taking functional arguments, as in the case of the quanti ers. The interpretations of these connectives use boolean logic de ned within Nuprl. The boolean connectives are rewritten in the second theorem to Nuprl's normal logical connectives, which are de ned using a propositions-as-types correspondence. The operator " in the imported theorem coerces a boolean into a Nuprl proposition. The imported list type is interpreted as Nuprl's list type, and the imported tail function is interpreted as Nuprl's tail function. Note however that htl is applied, as a function, to its argument, while the Nuprl tl is a de ned operator with a single operand (Nuprl also has an operator for function application, of course). We have used a notational device to suppress type arguments in the (pre-rewrite) imported theorem. Each of the imported constants in the theorem actually has at least one type argument. In the rewritten theorem, there are no hidden type arguments (the Nuprl operations are \implicitly polymorphic").
The correctness of the SCI cache coherence protocol is stated as ve linear temporal logic formulas. The rst, for example, expresses that there is always a unique cache owner. The notion of cache owner is fairly complex because of the distributed nature of the protocol. If no processor has requested to write to the cache, then memory is the owner. Otherwise, the owner roughly corresponds to the processor p whose variable cs p has value dirty. However, there are various cases where 0 or more than 1 processor has this value. In such cases there is a always a message in some processor's bu er that will cause it to set its value of cs p to dirty or to something else making it or some other processor the unique owner. In order to show that this uniqueness property and the other four properties hold, we prove a series of complex invariants from which these properties follow. These invariants are expressed as 14 lemmas (spanning several pages in 3]), each with several interdependent clauses. There are also many auxiliary concepts that appear in the invariants. For example, there are 6 predicates on processors indicating their degree of progress in getting on or o the doubly linked list. The most complex concept is a function called rank whose value re ects how close a process is to getting permission to write.
In related work, Stern and Dill 11] use Mur , a veri cation system that employs explicit state enumeration, to analyze SCI cache coherence. Their largest example included three processors with one cache line each, one memory with one address and two data values, and they reported nding several errors using a smaller example. The model they used was extracted from the C code describing the protocol in 8], whereas our model has been constructed from the informal English explanation. By abstracting at this level, inconsistencies in the lowerlevel description were removed. Our model also di ers from theirs (and from the SCI protocol standard) in that we have assumed that messages sent from one processor to another processor are always received in the order sent. Stern and Dill check for certain safety properties, two of which are formulated as invariants. One of their invariants corresponds to one of our ve correctness properties stating that processors in a certain state have a consistent view of the cache. The other is essentially the same as an invariant in one of our supporting lemmas stating at what point a processor is at the head of the linked list.
In 10], Park and Dill use PVS to verify the FLASH cache coherence protocol. Because the protocol uses directories instead of the distributed list of SCI, it seems simpler, and also it seems that the abstraction method they employ may not be applicable to SCI.
Imported Mathematics
In this section we describe the connection between HOL and Nuprl, and summarize how it was used in our proof.
The Importation Mechanism
We believe that much of the mathematics used in practical veri cation is highly sharable, including theories of basic data types, and also a good deal of the identi ers to values. Nuprl's display forms are used to de ne := and as in x operators. The dot is used for evaluation in a state and is overloaded. Here e s is expression evaluation de ned as (e s) and (y s) maps identi ers to values and is de ned as (s.1 y) (where .1 denotes the projection of the rst element of a pair). Other commands are de ned similarly. Note that the assignment statement updates the rst component of the state. The send command updates the second component by simply adding a history element to the front of the history with tt as its rst component and the new message as its last component. (Histories and bu ers are represented in reverse order.) The receive command also adds a history element to the front of the history, but is more complicated because it computes this element from the contents of the current history h. It uses an operation queue(p;h) which lters out those history elements that contain messages that have been sent and not yet received by process p. It then chooses the last (oldest) element and creates a new copy whose rst component is ff. The message bu er of a process p in state s, denoted (buf p]) s, is also computed using queue. In this case, the message components of the elements of list queue(p;s.2) are projected out.
A program is de ned as a pair containing a list of commands and an initial condition which is a predicate on state (of type state ! P 1 where P 1 is the type of Nuprl propositions). In our model, a command is enabled if it changes the state when applied. Thus commands whose guards are true but do not change the state are considered disabled. A trace is de ned in the usual way as a function from natural numbers to states such that for any n, there is an action (enabled or not) such that when applied to state n results in state n + 1.
The protocol is speci ed as a set of guarded actions. For example, the following is an action executed by the memory controller m. Here, the guard indicates that this action can be executed if the rst message in buf m] (m's message bu er) has type read cache freshQ which indicates that processor p wants to read. The message is removed from the queue (received) and the body is executed. A message read cache freshR(m; head m ; cv m ; gone) is sent to processor p, if some processor on the list had issued a write query (indicated by the argument gone). Otherwise, response read cache freshR(m; head m ; cv m ; ok) is sent to p. (Argument ok indicates that no processors are on the list which have requested to modify the store.) Local variable status m is used by m to record whether some processor is on the list which has issued a write query | its value is then Gone; or whether processors on the list have issued read queries only | its value is then Fresh; or if no such queries have been issued and hence the list is empty | its value is then Home. Finally, local variable head m is maintained by m to record the head of the list. As shown by this example, bodies can contain assignments, conditionals, and sends. In addition to receives, guards can be boolean conditions.
The protocol is represented as 21 actions: 4 for memory including the one above and 17 for each processor. Communication is via 14 types of messages, made up of 7 pairs of query (Q) and response (R) messages. In addition to the above action, memory has two actions responding to write requests, one from a processor that is already on the doubly linked list because it is reading, and one from a processor that is not yet on the list. It also has an action responding to a processor that wants to go o the list. The 17 actions for each processor include one read request, two write requests, actions for requesting to go on the list or to go o the list (for example, after it has \accessed" the store), an action for purging others o the list when it has been given permission to write the store and decided that it is indeed going to do so, actions for modifying the cache, as well as actions that respond to each kind of request from another processor. This high degree of communication is a main complicating factor in the protocol. Several rounds of messages must be exchanged before a processor is on the list with succ p and pred p properly set. Thus, the doubly linked list is constantly modi ed and constitutes an abstraction of the structure which arises during an actual computation. A variable status p keeps track of a processor p's state with respect to the list and can take on one of 8 possible values.
Formalization in Nuprl
Our formalization of correctness follows closely the proof in 3]. Our embedding of the semantics of state transition systems in Nuprl is fairly straightforward. We de ne a state as a pair where the rst component is the usual mapping from completion. A description of what remains to be done is included later in the paper. Details of the completed formalization will be available on the web at www.cs.bell-labs.com/~felty/sci/.
SCI Cache Coherence and its Formalization in Nuprl
This section gives an overview of the SCI cache coherence protocol and its formalization in Nuprl. Before proceeding to the overview, we give a brief description of Nuprl. Formal mathematics in Nuprl is organized in a single library, which is broken into les simulating a theory structure. Library objects can be de nitions, display forms, theorems, comments or objects containing ML code. De nitions de ne new operators, possibly with binding structure, in terms of existing Nuprl terms and previously de ned operators. Display forms provide notations for dened and primitive operators. These notations need not be parsable since Nuprl uses structure editors. Theorems have tree structured proofs, possibly incomplete. Each node has a sequent, and represents an inference step. The step is justi ed either by a primitive rule, or by a tactic. Nuprl's notion of tactic is derived from that of LCF, as is HOL's.
Nuprl's type theory has a rich set of type constructors. The following are some example types: n2N : B n ! B n , f x2N list j x 6 = nil g; n2N : B n ; (x; y) : Z N + ==(x 1 y 2 = y 1 x 2 ): The rst of these can be thought of as the type of functions mapping an n and an n-ary bit-vector to an n-ary bit-vector. The second is the type of nonempty list of natural numbers, the third is the collection of pairs (n; b) such that b is an n-ary bit-vector, and the last is a quotient type representing the rational numbers represented as pairs of integers with the usual equivalence relation.
SCI Cache Coherence
The SCI protocol is an IEEE standard for specifying communication between multiprocessors in a shared memory model 8]. Due to the space limitations we present a very high-level description of our model of the cache coherence part of that protocol. A detailed description of our model can be found in 3].
Processors which try to access the store form a doubly linked list. This list can be thought of as prioritizing processors so that read and write con icts do not arise. The protocol is distributed; there is no global cache or global data structure for the linked list. Instead each processor p has a set of local variables which keeps track of, for instance, its view of the cache (cv p ), knowledge of whether or not its view is valid (cs p ), and its current successor (succ p ) and predecessor (pred p ) on the linked list, if any. All communication is via point-to-point message passing. Since a very large number of processors could be on the network, a huge amount of concurrency is present, complicating the understanding of the protocol. (The IEEE standard speci es an upper bound of 64,000 processors. The proof we are formalizing proves the correctness for an arbitrary nite number of processors.) and models. Building it is time-consuming, and is largely duplication of e ort since these basic facts tend to be similar across systems. To avoid doing this ourselves, we import some basic mathematics from HOL 5], a system that has, over the years, accumulated a large corpus of mathematics of the kind useful for software/hardware veri cation. The paper 7] gives the basic design of the connection between HOL and Nuprl, and 4] gives an extension to it and an application to a moderately di cult problem in metamathematics. Our work, though just a rst step, establishes that sharing mathematics can be useful in software/hardware veri cation.
Type Annotation. Nuprl buys its expressive power at the cost of some traditional aspects of type systems. In particular, the type theory's exibility is in large part due to the fact that terms are untyped in the sense that one cannot determine from the syntax of an expression what, if any, type it is a member of. In this way, Nuprl is similar to set theory, with types being analogous to sets. This is a problem for automation for two reasons. First, it is often important for terms to come with their types; for example, in term rewriting, type information can enable a useful form of conditional rewriting. Second, typing properties require proof, so, for example, every time a lemma is instantiated, the instantiating objects must be proved to have the right types. We have designed and implemented an annotation scheme where terms are decorated with types in such a way that types can (almost always) be e ciently maintained during inference, but no new syntactic restrictions are placed on the logic. We have obtained roughly a factor of 10 speedup in term rewriting (the main workhorse in Nuprl proofs). Unfortunately, the implementation wasn't completed until part-way through the SCI e ort, so a good deal of work was done without its bene t.
Tactic support. We represent the protocol and its speci cation using a familiar kind of embedding of a Unity-like language. We used Nuprl's tactic mechanism to implement a suite of automated reasoners specialized to this model.
One might ask why not just use HOL (for example)? The answer is that we are aiming to make Nuprl an e ective tool for a wide range of formal problems related to protocol veri cation. For example, we want to be able to reason about abstraction and re nement methods (see 1] for an example), an area where expressive power can be a great advantage. Of course, there are veri cation tasks, such as checking that the atomic state transitions of a system preserve a property, where expressive power may be less important and where the speed and e ectiveness of basic inference mechanisms, such as term rewriting, is crucial. One goal of our work is to enhance the second kind of reasoning without imposing restrictions that a ect the rst kind.
Our proof is completely constructive (by choice). While we don't see much application for this fact in this particular case, it is noteworthy that constructivity has not gotten in the way. It may be possible to engineer constructive proofs of protocols from which one can synthesize, for example, programs that track simulations of the protocol and produce interesting data about the current state.
In the rest of the paper we describe the SCI correctness proof and the improvements we made to Nuprl. The proof is not yet nished, though it is nearing
